IS SHEKAU DEAD

The news coming from Northern Nigeria in the
past few days has been very cheery. Media
reports from the Military High Command indicate
that a senior Boko Haram member likely to be an
imitation of the group's leader, Abubakar Shekau,
might have died during a confrontation in
Konduga, Borno State. Lately, it has been one
sobering humiliation after another as the Nigerian
military battle fiercely to repel the advancing
Boko Haram insurgents. First, it was Gwoza, a
border town about 135 kilometres southeast of
Maiduguri, where the insurgents reportedly
sacked all the military formations including a
Police Training College. The terrorists later
occupied the town, hoisted their flag and
proceeded to declare their caliphate. From
Gwoza, they gradually advanced to the next town
known as Bama, which is about 60 kilometres to
Maiduguri the state capital. They attacked and
successfully occupied it. The battle in Bama was
very strategic for the insurgents as they
reportedly sacked the Emir and appointed a new
one. They also took over the Bama Prisons and
captured and imprisoned some locals who refused
to obey their directives.
The capture of these two local government areas
bolstered the confidence of the terrorists and
emboldened them as they continued to chant
songs of victory in jubilation around the town. It
was in Bama that the insurgents attempted a
change in strategy to see if they could enhance
their acceptability and legitimacy within the
communities. They began to break into shops and
allow the local people to collect food items for
free. They also took over some of the houses that
had boreholes and allowed the community
members to collect water for free. However, many
of the community members continued to be
fearful and suspicious of the insurgents.
From Bama, they proceeded to Konduga with full
confidence. The Local Government Area is about
25 kilometres to Maiduguri on the bank of
Ngadda River. In fact, part of the area covered by
the University of Maiduguri falls into the territory
of this local government area. With Gwoza and
Bama fully in the hands of the insurgents, it is
likely that the plan of the insurgents was to
capture Konduga and then use it as a base to
launch an attack on Maiduguri. However, that
was not to be. On their way to Konduga, the
insurgents ran into a calculated ambush of
soldiers who levelled them. The casualty figures
were heavy on the side of the insurgents. In fact,
in one of the videos that shot by the locals,
corpses of the insurgents littered the streets and
farmlands. Community members were seen
raining curses at the corpses of the insurgents.
Before they could consolidate their grip on Bama,
the revelations of the Australian "negotiator", Dr.
Stephen Davies, hit the media and triggered
some finger pointing among politicians. It will be
interesting to find out the level of impact this had
on the success or failure of the insurgents lately.
Another interesting part of what may be an
unfolding drama is that since the insurgency
started, this is probably the first time that the
military successfully ambushed the insurgents.
How come? The pictures from the videos indicate
that Boko Haram is still the same rag-tag group of
ill-trained young men. How have they been
managing to defeat a well-trained Nigerian Army
up to the point that they had to beat a "tactical
manoeuvre" twice into the Republic of Cameroon?
What has changed suddenly?
Another fact that is noteworthy is that many
residents of Maiduguri were jubilant as soon as
they sighted the soldiers indicating that they
were happy with the victory. This suggests that it
is likely that ordinary citizens and Nigerian
soldiers may be in agreement on the need to
eradicate the Boko Haram insurgency. What may
yet be unclear to many observers is the
disposition of senior military officers to this goal.
Who could be jeopardising or even sabotaging the
efforts of these soldiers? Who are those who
issued those conflicting orders that led to many
causalities on the side of the military? What about
the reported withdrawal of soldiers a few hours
before the arrival of the insurgents? How valid are
the complaints that our military is less equipped
than the insurgents and who is to be held
responsible? What about those who allegedly
count rounds of ammunition and give to soldiers
in cellophane bags in a way that put them at risk
and lower their morale? When will a
comprehensive inquiry be done into the probable
reasons that pushed those convicted soldiers
from Giwa Barracks to attempt mutiny even
though they knew that death is the
consequence? It is obvious that the insurgents
are not sophisticated. However, it appears that
they allegedly have possible channels of sensitive
information which they leverage on coupled with
a terrain advantage. It is clearly evident that the
insurgents do not have superior tactics. It
appears the ground is prepared for them perhaps
by some unscrupulous collaborators somewhere
in the crowd.
A clear pattern that is beginning to emerge to
discerning minds that unlike other insurgencies
like the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hamas in Palestine
and Talibans in Pakistan, Boko Haram has neither
acceptability nor trust in communities where it
operates. Its new strategy to rebuild legitimacy in
Bama suffered a setback. This legitimacy deficit
may turn out to be its greatest undoing and
should make its defeat and ultimate annihilation
relatively easy. The attack on the rural market in
Mainok suggests that the fighters have now
become hungry with very limited food supplies. If
such a blockade is a deliberate effort, then it
should be sustained as hungry and thirsty
insurgents are likely to have low morale and
surrender faster. Intelligence gathering should be
strengthened in collaboration with embedded
community members. After the second defeat in
Konduga the morale of these fighters might have
been terrified and demoralised. The
bombardment from the military should continue
ceaselessly at such a time. If possible, all the
borders between Cameroon and Nigeria should be
blocked temporarily to ensure that the insurgents
do not escape into their country. In between the
questions raised above and the suggestions
offered, one is confident that the end of Boko
Haram insurgency may not be far away.
Insinuations that the insurgents have the
capacity to fight for another 45 years is a fallacy.
It is not surprising that as they are about settling
down to establish their caliphate and attack
Maiduguri, they are simply throwing themselves
open for a sucker punch. Kudos to our military.
This cup will soon pass us by.